Applications / AEA-STATE/1 version 1.0
Applications begin with questions.
These are hypotheses H1–H6 from the tagged research plan, not existing capabilities. The proposed applications span autonomous uncrewed systems, space systems, test ranges and hypersonic logging. Each investigation has an experiment and a condition that would count against it.
H1, H4 and H6 are research questions only and are not part of the current evaluation offer.
TRL 3 · host-tested; seeking evaluation partners.
Read the source research plan ↗H1A future signed state envelopeFuture profile / AEA-AUTH/1
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
An authenticated, sequence-numbered outer envelope could identify forged or replayed state reports within an agreed computation and bandwidth budget. AEA does not authenticate senders; AEA-AUTH/1 is not built.
Experiment
Implement the draft envelope with HMAC-SHA256 or Ed25519 reference vectors. Test reordered, delayed and forged records against a defined attack corpus.
Measure
False accepts of forged or replayed records, plus computation and link cost.
Failure condition
The envelope exceeds the target platform’s CPU or link budget. Hardware timing is not yet measured.
H2State comparison during a GNSS outageAutonomous uncrewed systems / future research
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
AEA does not detect or bound drift or perform dead-reckoning. H2 asks whether a separate estimator could detect abnormal sensor drift sooner by comparing propagated state with earlier trusted records.
Experiment
Use public GNSS-outage datasets with simulated sensor faults and bias. Add a separate future uncertainty/covariance profile; do not change the current record format.
Measure
Detection latency and false-alarm rate against innovation-gating baselines.
Failure condition
Detection latency or false-alarm rate is no better than the baseline.
H3Cross-consistency among multiple nodesAutonomous teams / multiple nodes
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
AEA does not reject spoofed packets or provide anti-spoofing. H3 asks whether a future signed exchange and relative measurements could help several nodes identify an inconsistent or malfunctioning peer.
Experiment
Simulate three or more nodes with one emitting false or degraded position tracks. This requires the unbuilt H1 profile and relative range-measurement models.
Measure
Receiver operating characteristic area under the curve for identifying false peer reports.
Failure condition
No statistically significant improvement over local range-residual filters.
H4Fewer errors when platform logs are mergedTest ranges / space systems / multi-vendor records
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
Mandatory reference-frame and time-scale tags might reduce reconciliation errors compared with untyped CSV or JSON workflows. This benefit has not been demonstrated.
Experiment
Inject frame and time-scale label errors into multi-vehicle logs. Compare detection and alignment with legacy workflows.
Measure
Frame and epoch error-detection rate and automated alignment speed.
Failure condition
Tags do not measurably reduce ingestion errors, or conversion overhead negates the benefit.
H5Embedded cost on physical microcontrollersTarget hardware / measurement plan
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
Record sealing and verification might fit the target platform’s timing and stack budgets. Hardware timing, stack depth and on-target measurements are not yet measured.
Experiment
Measure cycle counts and stack high-water marks on physical Cortex-M boards running a bare-metal C caller.
Measure
Execution latency, stack high-water mark and resource use against the predeclared budgets in H5.
Failure condition
Measured stack or execution latency exceeds the H5 limits. Numeric hardware targets remain in the source research plan, not a claimed result.
H6Record recovery after a communications blackoutHypersonic flight recorder / disconnected logging research
Hypothesis / not demonstrated
Local sealing might support post-test checks of stored records after communications loss. AEA does not maintain navigation through a blackout or detect SEUs.
Experiment
Use hardware-in-the-loop flash logging with simulated link loss, fault injection and power interruptions. Read records back after the test.
Measure
Detection rates for corrupted, truncated or incomplete records, plus dropped records and buffer occupancy.
Failure condition
Memory or write-latency overhead causes buffer overflows or dropped records at the proposed logging rate.
Baseline scope
AEA does not navigate, dead-reckon, detect or bound drift, authenticate senders, reject spoofed packets, provide electronic warfare or anti-spoofing capabilities, save propellant, or detect SEUs.
AEA-AUTH/1 is a planned future profile for keyed signing. It is not built and is not part of the current library.
The experiments would test additional systems around the record format. Positive results are not assumed.
Technical evaluation
Inspect the record. Reproduce the evidence.
An evaluator integration kit is available on request.